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INTRODUCTION: WHERE COPYRIGHT FAILS POETRY

THE RED WHEELBARROW
so much depends
upon
a red wheel
barrow
glazed with rain
water
beside the white
chickens.
William Carlos Williams
Copyright does not protect facts or ideas, but only an author's
original expression.1 Often, though, it is difficult to distill protected
expression from unprotected ideas or facts that reside in the public
domain. 2 Copyright protection for poetry is particularly problematic
because a poem's ideas are often intertwined with a poem's sounds,
shape, and images. It is often not only difficult to extract ideas from a
poem's surface, but once ideas are "discovered," it may even be
3
difficult to articulate exactly what these main ideas or themes are.
William Carlos Williams' poem, The Red Wheelbarrow, one of the most
famous twentieth century poems, provides a good example of the
problems inherent in distinguishing idea and expression in poetry.
Williams' deceptively simple poem exemplifies the melding of idea and
expression into syntax and form so that the poem itself becomes the
meaning. 4 In The Red Wheelbarrow, it is impossible to separate
Williams' "idea" of a red wheelbarrow from the context of his poem's

1.
Baker v. Seldon, 101 U.S. 99, 105 (1880).
2.
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (1930 2d Cir.) (noting that when a
"plagiarist does not take out a block in situ but an abstract of the whole, decision is more
troublesome").
3.
See, e.g., Guinter Eich, Some Remarks on Literature and Reality, in A FIELD GUIDE TO
CONTEMPORARY POETRY AND POETICS 115, 116 (Stuart Friebert, et at., eds. 1997) (describing

poetry as a "falling together of word and object" which aims to translate reality). "The aim of
poetic communication is to introduce a related feeling or grasp of the one aspect of the human
condition to the reader ..
" Miroslav Holub, Poetry and Science, in A FIELD GUIDE TO
CONTEMPORARY POETRY AND POETICS 44, 51 (Stuart Friebert, et at., eds. 1997).

4.

Holub, supra note 3, at 51.
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words, line breaks, and even his distribution of white space on the
5
page, all of which describe and give meaning to Williams' vision.
Copyright currently protects poetry just like it protects any
other kind of writing or work of authorship. 6 Poetry, therefore, is
subject to the same minimal standards for originality that are used for
other written works, and the same tests determine whether copyright
infringement has occurred. 7 The low threshold of originality that
determines if a work is eligible for copyright embodies the notion that
judges should not make aesthetic determinations of what is or is not
art.8 This low standard serves poetry with the same sweeping
graciousness that it serves other genres, ensuring that no one kind or
style of poetry receives special treatment in terms of protectibility. 9
However, the tests for copyright infringement that courts use are not
adequate in deducing if one poem is impermissibly similar to another.
In an infringement action, once copying has been established, 10
improper appropriation or infringement is determined by a
substantial similarity test that compares the two works in question. 1
Courts currently apply a variety of substantial similarity tests that
attempt to separate the copyrightable elements in a work from the
non-copyrightable elements and then determine if the copier has
taken a substantial amount of copyrightable elements.1 2 Many of the
tests designed to determine substantial similarity between works have
been criticized for their vague standards and unpredictable

5.

Id.

6.
See RALPH S. BROWN & ROBERT C. DENICOLA, COPYRIGHT: UNFAIR COMPETITION AND
RELATED Topics BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF WORKS OF AUTHORSHIP 22 (8th ed. 2002)

(noting that once a work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression as required by the 1976
Copyright Act, it qualifies for federal copyright protection).
7.
See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (noting that while
originality is required, "even a slight amount will suffice").
8.
See Bleinstein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903) (explaining
why judges should not determine what qualifies as art). Justice Holmes noted that "[i]t would be
a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges
of the worth of pictorial illustrations" in this case because not only would judges fail to
appreciate some "works of genius," but might also deny protection "to pictures which appealed to
a public less educated then a judge." Id.
9.
Poems that may not be considered original by some still get copyright protection The
effect of this is to protect just about anything which someone claims is poetry. While some might
argue that this dilutes the "art" of poetry somewhat, it alleviates aesthetic determinations that
are almost sure to vary from poet to poet or from reader to reader.
10. There are two steps in any copyright infringement action. First a trier of fact must
determine if there has been copy in fact. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON

COPYRIGHT, §13.01 (1963). Then, if there is copying in fact, there is a determination if the
copying is an infringement. Id.
11. Id. at §13.01 (B).
12. Id.
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applications. 13 These tests become even more problematic when
applied to poetry because poetry communicates its ideas differently
than genres such as fiction or non-fiction.
Poetry is a genre in which language is carefully manipulated
into lines, stanzas, and rhythms, all of which add meaning to a poem.
Despite the particular expressive means available in different genres,
courts currently use the same tests for substantial similarity for
different types of literary works. 14 Copyright infringement actions are
usually determined by examining the substantial similarity between
two written works by comparing aspects like plot, character, and
descriptions. 15 Courts applying copyright law need to recognize how
poetry operates as a distinct genre and protect it based on all the
elements of original expression that are available for poets to use.
In this paper, I will first summarize the background principles
and purposes of copyright. Then, in Part II, I will explain the tests for
substantial similarity that are currently used by courts to determine
misappropriation. Part III of my paper will outline the ways poetry
can be expressive, focusing particularly on Williams' The Red
Wheelbarrow as an example. In Part IV, using my discussion of
poetry's expressive elements as a springboard, I will show how the
current tests for improper appropriation are not suited for poetry. In
Part V of my paper, I will argue for a new improper appropriation test
for poetry that compares not only two poems' words but also the
words' arrangement and layout on the page. I will explain how this
''expressive elements test" works and how its application would better
serve poetry within the purposes of copyright.

II. BACKGROUND: ORIGINALITY AND THE PURPOSES OF COPYRIGHT
The purpose of copyright is to benefit the public by providing
an incentive to authors to keep creating new works. 16 As the Supreme
Court has interpreted the constitutional grant of power to Congress, it
is the public, not the author, whom copyright serves, 17 Copyright
13. See, e.g., id. at § 13.03(A) (describing substantial similarity as a standard that is "the
least susceptible of helpful generalizations"); Aaron M. Broaddus, Eliminating the Confusion: A
Restatement of the Test for Copyight Infringement, 5 DEPAuL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 43,

56-57 (1995) (criticizing a test as helpful in theory, but not in practice).
14. Robert H. Rotstein, Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the Fiction of the
Work, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 725, 725 (1993).
15. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54-56 (2d Cir. 1936)
(comparing the characters, sequence of details, and "dramatic meaning" of two plays).
16. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 477 (1984).
17. Id. at 478. See also Leslie A. Kurtz, Speaking to the Ghost: Idea and Expression in
Copyright, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1221, 1223 (1993) ('The primary purpose of copyright is to
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serves the public
by granting limited rights to authors in their
"original works."1 8 This reward to authors includes such things as the
rights to perform, to "prepare derivative works," to copy, and to
distribute their works. 19 The Supreme Court has described the
creation of these limited rights as a "difficult balance between the
interests of the authors and inventors in the control and exploitation
of their writings on the one hand, and society's competing interest in
20
the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand."
This balancing effort continues when courts not only decide what
qualifies for protection, but also decide when an author's rights have
been violated.
Some countries recognize an author's moral or natural right to
his literary work, 21 but the United States' system of copyright seeks to
benefit the public by "secur[ing] a fair return for an 'author's' creative
labor."22 Thus, the Copyright Clause, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court, is a system of economic incentive to authors to create for the
public benefit. 23 Under this theory, the value of an author's work or
contribution to society is the amount "those who benefit from the book
would be willing to pay rather than do without it."24 Copyright then
serves the function of rewarding authors for contributions that are
original or new "[bly assuring the author of an original work the
exclusive benefits of whatever commercial success his or her work
enjoys." 25 This system works smoothly when authors are given rights
promote creativity and disseminate creative works, so that the public may benefit from the labor
of authors.").
18. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
19. Id.
20. Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 429.
21. See, e.g., JOHN F. WHICHER, THE CREATIVE ARTS AND JUDICIAL PROCESS 8-9 (1965)
(describing the concept as it is recognized in some other countries). Cf. Stephen Breyer, The
Uneasy Case for Copyright:A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies,and Computer Programs,
84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 289-91 (1970) (describing the Kantian view that the "law is needed to
protect important personal interests of the author" and noting that while copyright does not aim
to protect "dignitary interests" there is possible tort law in this area which might prohibit
"garbling a man's work and then attributing it to him"). For historical background on rights
theories, see Paul Edward Geller, Copyright History and the Future: What's Culture Got to Do
With It?, 47 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y USA 209, 210-25 (2000).
22. David Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship and Originality, 38
HOUS. L. REV. 1, 133 (2001) (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975)).
23. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (explaining the economic philosophy
behind the clause).
24. Breyer, supra note 21, at 285. But Stephen Breyer argues that this approach does not
necessarily determine the "social value" or just value of a given work. Id. at 287.
25. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm,49 VAND. L.
REV. 483, 513 (1996). This system of reward may in itself be problematic in genres like poetry
because the commercial benefits of creation are arguably minimal for most poets. I intend
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to original expression. However, problems can occur if copyright
overprotects works or aspects of works and authors are given
monopolies over ideas or facts that should belong in the public
26
domain.
Overprotection chills the creative production of new works
because it discourages authors from drawing on ideas and facts
presented in prior works for fear that "their creations will too readily
be found substantially similar to preexisting works" and thus
constitute infringement. 27 A fine-tuned appreciation for what rights
an author has based on notions of original creation is therefore
necessary to optimally spur creation.
One of the challenges for courts has been to define "original
works of authorship" in light of the purposes of copyright. 28 The
Supreme Court has defined an author as "he to whom anything owes
its origin." 29 Lower courts have also interpreted originality broadly.
In Alfred Bell & Co., Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit distinguished the "uniqueness,
ingenuity and inventiveness" required for a patent from "any such
high standard" to obtain a copyright. 30 The court found that "[n]o
large measure of novelty [was] necessary," and that copyright
demanded only that the author contribute "more than a 'merely
trivial' variation, something recognizably 'his own."' 31 The court found
that hand-engraved mezzotint reproductions of paintings in the public
domain fulfilled the originality requirement because they were not
"exact" copies. 32 The choices of the engravers, even if trivial, made the
mezzotints different from the paintings they had copied and these

though, not to focus on the problematic aspects of economic incentives for poets but instead on
notions of originality for purposes of infringement for poetry.
26. See id. at 513 (discussing potential problems with extending copyright protection to
elements that are likely to appear in other works).
27. Id. (quoting Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983).
28. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). See Alan. L. Durham, The Random Muse: Authorship and
Indeterminacy, 44 WM.& MARY L. REV. 569, 576 (2002) (noting the dichotomy between copyright
and patent and concluding that therefore, "[w]hatever an 'author' may be, it must be something
different than an 'inventor,"' and that a "'writing' must be something other than a 'discovery"').
29. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
30. 191 F.2d 99, 100 (2d Cir. 1951).
31. Id. at 102 (quoting Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp, 150 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1945)). This
court also noted that a "distinguishable variation" might even be caused by an accident such as a
"copyists bad eyesight" or "shock caused by a clap of thunder." Id. at 105. This idea seems
problematic in that the author did not actually create the variation by his own ingenuity. But,
on the other hand, it relieves the court from decisions of just how much intent or talent is
necessary.
32. Alfred Bell & Co. Ltd., 191 F.2d at 104-05.
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differences were sufficient to pass copyright's low originality
33
standard.
While the threshold of originality is easily passed, the only part
of an author's work that is protected under copyright is the part that
is new or original. 34
Copyright does not protect "idea[s],
procedure[s],... concept[s], principle[s], [or] discover[ies]." 35 It also
does not protect facts or parts of a work that have been taken from the
public domain. 36 These limits hearken back to the requirement of
originality. For example, no one can claim copyright over the general
37
idea of a story about a son who wants to kill his stepfather.
Likewise, no one can claim copyright protection over the idea of a
character like Hamlet. 38 Even if someone claimed that a character
like Hamlet was his own original idea and that he had not borrowed it
even unconsciously from an earlier work, copyright does not protect
ideas because ideas are not particular enough to belong to any one
person. If someone could claim exclusivity to themes such as these, he
would monopolize a large field of creativity that many authors use as
impetus. This result would frustrate copyright's purpose of benefiting
the public through providing incentives for authors to create.
In Feist Publications,Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., the
Supreme Court reiterated the necessity of originality for any work to
be copyrightable. 39 The Court noted that, in order to further the
purpose of benefiting the public, "copyright assures authors the right
to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon
the ideas and information conveyed by a work."40 The Court found
that a phonebook that was "limited to basic subscriber information
and arranged alphabetically" was not copyrightable because (1) the
"names, towns, and telephone numbers" were not original and (2) the

33. Id.
34. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Snyder, 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991) (noting that while originality
does not mean novelty, originality is still required and therefore "the mere fact that a work is
copyrighted does not mean that every element of the work may be protected").
35. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
36. See L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding that a
replica of an Uncle Sam bank, that was in the public domain, did possess the requisite degree of
originality just because it was in a different medium than the public domain "prototype").
37. This is an idea, and, therefore, not copyrightable.
38. It is questionable as to whether or not copyright can be claimed in a character at all-it
depends on the specificity with which the character is portrayed. See Nichols v. Universal
Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 121, 122-23 (2d Cir. 1930) (noting that the "stock figures" of the "low
comedy Jew and Irishman" are not copyrightable).
39. Feist Publ'ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 346 (finding that "[o]riginality is a constitutional
requirement").
40. Id. at 349-50.

922

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 58:3:915

arrangement of this information "utterly lack[ed] originality."' 41 Facts
are not copyrightable because they belong to everyone and are not
"original" to anyone, but compilations of facts can be copyrightable if
they possess "an original selection or arrangement." 42 The protection
for compilations does not protect an author's hard work in gathering
43
factual information because the work itself is not original expression.
An author's selection and arrangement of facts are the only original
expression in a compilation and therefore are the only elements that
44
copyright protects.
While it is fairly easy to single out facts in a work,
distinguishing unprotectible ideas from original "expression" can be
much more difficult. 45 In Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., Judge
Learned Hand found that there was a point at which a play becomes
generalized into a "series of abstractions" and is therefore no longer
protectible. 46 He noted that "otherwise the playwright could prevent
the use of his 'ideas,' to which, apart from their expression, his
property is never extended." 47 The problem is, as Judge Hand
articulated, "[n]obody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and
nobody ever can. ' 48 This imprecise distinction between the idea and
the expression calls for a case by case determination that is inherently
subjective. 49 If a determination of the copyrightable elements of a
41. Id. at 341, 363-64. The court noted that if some "works must fail" the test for
originality, they could not "imagine a more likely candidate." Id. at 364. Still, Feist "reaffirms
that the requirements of originality are, in fact, minimal." Alan L. Durham, Speaking of the
World: Fact, Opinion, and the Originality Standard of Copyright, 33 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 791, 812
(2001).
42. Feist Publ'ns,Inc., 499 U.S. at 348.
43. Id. at 350-51 (finding that the copyright in compilations is limited to the "particular
selection and arrangement" and that "[iun no event may copyright extend to the facts
themselves").
44. Kurtz, supra note 17, at 1232 (finding that "copyright should protect the meaning
embedded within a work less rigorously than it protects the work's literal elements" because the
meaning "tends to be more universal" and part of the "vast accumulation of human experience").
45. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (noting that in
cases where there are non-copyrightable elements it is necessary to distinguish the "expression
and what is expressed"); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936)
(noting that a playwright could take public domain information from another play as long as he
"kept clear of its 'expression"'); WHICHER, supra note 21, at 121 (noting that the idea/expression
issue is one of the "hardest problems to solve in the law of copyright").
46. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Kurtz, supra note 17, at 1233 (equating copyright with swiss cheese, in which the
holes represent the unprotectible elements that "cannot be simply snipped out as with scissors"
but rather "conceptualized out by the perceiver, who will need to make judgments and
evaluations"); WHICHER, supra note 21, at 124 (describing the line between ideas and expression
as a "fluid one, drawn in light of the facts of each case").
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work is necessarily subjective, 50 determining whether a work has
unlawfully appropriated the protectible elements of another must also
involve subjectivity. 51 The tests for infringement that courts currently
use to determine substantial similarity highlight how courts have
tried to resolve the idea-expression problem.
III. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY:
A. Steps in an Infringement Claim
In order to succeed on a claim of copyright infringement, an
author must show (1) valid copyright of a work and (2) copying of
protected elements of that work. 52 In Feist, the Supreme Court
reiterated the minimal requirements for originality but made clear
that copyright protection to a work extended only to the protected
elements of a work. 53 Because the names, addresses, and other
information in the phonebook were nonprotectible facts and because
the authors of the phonebook had not selected or arranged these facts
in such a way as to constitute originality or "authorship," the
phonebook was not protected. 54 Even if the phonebook had possessed
sufficient originality, protection in this case would only have extended
to the expressive elements in the book, such as the "selection,
coordination, and arrangement" of its facts. 55 Thus, even if a work
satisfies the threshold question of originality, it is only protected as to
those elements that actually are original.
The second step in a copyright infringement action is to
determine if protectible original elements have been copied 56 This is a
two-step process. First, it must be shown that the defendant actually

50. Cf. Kurtz, supra note 17, at 1231-32 (hypothesizing that the "greater the work of art the
more stubbornly it resists simple explanation and the more difficult it is to abstract from it that
which makes it unique").
51. This is because in order t o determine if one writer has infringed on another's
copyright, a trier of fact must determine what is original, and therefore protected, in the first
author's work-one must separate the idea from the expression and then compare those
elements it finds protectible.
52. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, at § 13.01(B). Protectible elements of an author's
work refers back to the requirement of originality.
53. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345-49 (1991).
54. Id. at 363-64 (concluding that copyright does not "afford protection from copying to a
collection of facts that are selected, coordinated, and arranged in a way that utterly lacks
originality").
55.
56.

Id.
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 13.01(B).
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copied or copied in fact. 57 When there is no "direct proof' of copying,
copying in fact may be shown by circumstantial evidence of "access" as
well as "substantial similarity" between the defendant's and the
plaintiffs work. 58 Second, if actual copying is shown, the plaintiff
must then show that the copying is "actionable;" i.e., that this actual
copying infringes on the plaintiffs protected expression. 59 In this
second step, the court must ask if the works are "substantially
60
similar... such that liability may attach."
For improper appropriation, it is not enough that the nonprotected elements of two works are substantially similar; a
substantial amount of expression must be stolen. 6 1 In Mazer v. Stein,
the Supreme Court noted that because copyright "protection is given
only to the expression of the idea-not the idea itself," the plaintiffs
could "not exclude others from using statuettes of human figures in
table lamps." 62 The plaintiffs "[could] only prevent use of copies of
63
their statuettes as such or as incorporated in some other article."
The idea of a statuette incorporated into a lamp is therefore not
protected, but a particular author's expression of a statuette is.64 This
holding still begs the questions: (1) What exactly is the expression?
And (2) When is a statuette substantially similar in its expression to
5
another?6
B. Substantial Similarity Tests
Lower courts have come up with a variety of substantial
similarity tests. Some courts follow Judge Learned Hand's famous
"abstractions test. ' 66 In these cases, the courts must decide "the point"
57. Id. (calling it a "factual question" as to whether or not the defendant "used the plaintiffs
work as a model, template, or even inspiration").
58. Kurtz, supra note 17, at 1235. Note that the substantial similarity necessary here
differs from the substantial similarity in determining actionable infringement.
59. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 13.01(B).
60. Id. See also Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (finding
that the question in literary appropriation is whether the defendant took a "substantial" part of
the plaintiff's work so that the taking was not "fair use").
61. See, e.g., Feist Publ'ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 363 (finding that the printing of names in a
telephone directory, while substantially similar to a previously existing directory, was not a
copyright violation because "there is nothing remotely creative about arranging names
alphabetically").
62. 347 U.S. 201, 217-18 (1954).
63. Id. at 218.
64. Id.
65. "Although the cases treat expression as the most valued portion of the text, they rarely
say what expression is." Rotstein, supra note 14, at 765.
66. Nichols, 45 F.2d. at 121. See also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 13.03(A)(1)(a)
(describing Judge Hand's test).
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in a "series of abstraction" at which a story sheds generality and
becomes an author's original expression. 67 While this test "vividly
describes the nature of the quest," which is to find the expression, the
test lacks any plain method to determine when this line is crossed. 68
In Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp, Judge Learned Hand
found that the expression of the play "Dishonored Lady" had been
appropriated by the movie "Letty Lyton." 69 Both scripts concerned the
true story of a Scotch girl tried for murder. 70 In this case, the court
found details in the movie that tracked the play such as the "mis en
scene, the same city and the same social class" and the choice of a
"South American villain."
These overlapping details constituted
substantial similarity and were not merely unprotected "general
patterns."71 The court described these details as a confluence of scenes
that copied the "dramatic meaning" or the "dramatic significance" of
the play. 72 Judge Learned Hand held that, even though dialogue had
not been taken, it was enough that "substantial parts [of the story]
were lifted."73 He noted that "no plagiarist can excuse the wrong by
showing how much of his work he did not pirate."74 The problem with
Judge Hand's abstractions test, by his own admission, is that the test
is uncertain and creates ad hoc determinations of when a particular
75
pattern or idea is sufficiently clothed in expression to be protected.
Professor Zechariah Chafee attempted to refine the
abstractions test with his "pattern test."76 This test essentially looks
at the "sequence of events and the interplay of major characters" in
67. Nichols, 45 F.2d. at 121-22. "The process of abstraction can be seen as involving an
omission, a setting aside, as more and more of the detail is left out ....
It is those very details or
circumstances, stripped from a work by the process of abstraction, that are truly the creation of
an author." Kurtz, supra note 17, at 1248.
68. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 13.03(A)(1)(a). See also Kurtz, supra note 17, at
1246-48 (noting that the abstractions method is also problematic because a work can be
"abstracted at many levels" and that a finding of infringement often depends on the level that is
chosen as the abstract-ness cut-off).
69. See generally Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1936)
(finding for the plaintiff in a copyright action).
70. Id. at 49-53. The story itself was in the public domain because it is a fact and therefore
free for everyone to draw from.
71. Id. at 53.
72. Id. at 55-56. The court also noted this similarity might have been to unconscious
copying, but that that did not excuse the infringer. Id. at 54. None of these elements were found
in the real life, public domain story. Id. at 49-50.
73. Id. at 56.
74. Id. at 55-56 (noting also that "[s]peech is only a small part of a dramatist's means of
expression").
75. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
76. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 13.03(A)(1)(a). See generally Zechariah Chafee Jr.,
Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503 (1945)(discussing the test).
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deciding if two works are substantially similar.7 7 Nimmer explains
the pattern test by comparing two variations on Shakespeare's "Romeo
and Juliet."78
He asserts that the idea "of a romance between
members of two rival families" is not an infringement but that "West
Side Story," while set in a different time period, would infringe Romeo
and Juliet under the "pattern test" because it takes the same sequence
of events and characters. 79 This formulation is different than
comparisons of "plot" because the plot of the work can be described
very generally or very specifically.8 0 Chafee's test assumes that the
story becomes protected expression at the level of sequence,
arrangement, characters, and dialogue. 8 ' While this test may be
"more precise than the abstractions test," it has also been criticized as
"helpful in theory" but not "in practice" because it still "does not tell us
where the line between unprotectible ideas and protected expression
82
should be drawn."
Another popular approach, which was once widely used but
now may be falling into disfavor, is the "total concept and feel test"
articulated by the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit in Roth
Greeting Cards v. United Card Co..83 In Roth, the court found that the
"total concept and feel of the cards of United [were] the same as the
copyrighted cards of Roth."8 4 The court considered the cards as
"combined compositions of art and text" and found that there were
only "minor variations in color and style of defendant's card" so that
''even a casual observer" would recognize the "remarkable similarity"
85
between the cards.
The Ninth Circuit refined this "total concept and feel test" in
Sid & Mary Krofft T.V. Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., which

77. Id.
78. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, §13.03(A)(1)(b).
79. Id. This assumes, of course, that Romeo and Juliette is not in the public domain.
80. Comparisons of two plots would take us back to Judge Hand's abstractions test where it
was necessary to abstract the expression from the general themes.
81. Id. See also Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 683 F.2d 610, 628-29 (2d Cir.
1982) (comparing the story of Tarzan by Edgar Rice Burroughs with the story of the movie
' Tarzan, the Ape Man").
82. Broaddus, supra note 13, at 56-57 (also noting that its "major drawback is its specific
application to literary works" and that it doesn't help in cases "involving works not consisting of
a 'sequence of events' or 'the development of the interplay of characters").
83. 429 F.2d 1106, 1110-12 (1970). See also Broaddus, supra note 13, at 57-60 (discussing
Roth and the "total concept and feel" test).
84. Roth Greeting Cards, 429 F.2d at 1110.
85. Id. at 1110-11. The court here gave an example of two cards it found to be substantially
similar. Id. One card had, "on its front, a colored drawing of a cute moppet suppressing a smile
and, on the inside, the words 'i wuv you' " and the other card "[w]ith the exception of minor
variations in color and style" was "identical." Id.

2005]

COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND POETRY

927

involved the question of defendant's appropriation of the plaintiffs
cartoon creations as the basis for the defendant's "McDonaldland" TV
commercials.8 6 In this case, the court "established a two-part test to
determine substantial similarity. The court used an 'extrinsic test' to
determine similarity in general ideas and an 'intrinsic test' to compare
the particular expression used. 8 7 The extrinsic test allows "analytical
dissection and expert testimony" because it depends on "specific
criteria which can be listed and analyzed."88 The intrinsic test, on the
other hand, depends upon the reactions of the "ordinary reasonable
person" so that "analytic dissection and expert testimony are not
appropriate."8 9 The court found that McDonald's had misappropriated
the 'total concept and feel' of the Pufnstuf show" because the
"Pufnstuf series" was not just a general idea. 90 The court found
protectible expression in the characters' "developed personalities and
particular ways of interacting with each other" and in the setting's
"several unique features."9 1 The court approved of the jury's decision
to consider the "works as a whole" instead of focusing on "isolated
elements of each work to the exclusion of other elements, combination
92
of elements, and expressions therein."
The total concept and feel test has been criticized because of its
vagueness and indeterminacy. 93 For instance, not only is it difficult to
determine what "total concept and feel means," but "[n]one of the
94
courts that apply the test have attempted to define these terms."
Another problem is that the terminology for this test is confusing
because "concepts," like ideas, are not eligible for copyright
protection. 95 The phrasing "feel of a work" is also unclear since it does
not distinguish the protectible from the unprotectible elements of a

86. 562 F.2d 1157, 1165-67 (9th Cir. 1977).
87. Id.; see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 13.03(A)(1)(c) (discussing Sid & Mary
Krofft Tv. Prod., Inc., and the court's two-part test for determining "substantial similarity").
88. Sid & Mary Krofft TV. Prod., Inc., 562 F.2d at 1164.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1169.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, §13.03 (A)(1)(c) (noting that it mostly serves the
limited field of "juvenile works" and that if expanded it "threatens to subvert the very essence of
copyright, namely the protection of original expression").
94. Broaddus, supra note 13, at 58-59.
95. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 13.03 (A)(1)(c). It is also not clear what function
the first part of the test fulfills or what role expert testimony or dissection serves in the final
judgment of infringement. See John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58
CHI. L. REV. 119, 131-32 (1991) (noting that "Krofft's exactitude implied that expert opinion
fulfills some clear and definite function" but that "once again readers must wonder what that
function is").
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work. 96 In Krofft, the court particularly noted that, once the extrinsic
test is passed, the trier of fact is left to determine infringement by
comparing the whole of both works. 97 At this point in the test, the
trier of fact is left to his own understanding of "total concept and feel"
in order to determine if two works are substantially similar. 98 Critics
have argued that this test can produce uncertain and random
results. 99 For instance, Nimmer notes that "total concept and feel
should not be viewed as the sin qua non for infringement" because a
work that would otherwise be infringing should not be relieved of
infringement just because its "total concept and feel" are different. 10 0
Some courts have tried to create different tests for specialized
or complex areas such as in "infringement of computer programs."' 01
For example, there is an "iterative test" which focuses on use and
literal copying and allows expert testimony to guide the trier of fact in
determining infringement. 10 2 Courts have also applied a test in
computer program cases that extends protection to the "structure,
sequence and organization" of a work. 0 3 This method has been
criticized as extending copyright protection too far into the bounds of
unprotectible ideas by failing to "recognize that a computer program
consists of not one, but a series of ideas."'1 4 Critics worry that
overprotection will lead to a "chilling effect on creativity and
0 5
innovation."1
Another approach used to determine infringement for software
programs, is the "filtration approach."'1 6 Here, a court combines
96. Id.
97. Sid & Mary Krofft T.V Prod., Inc., 562 F.2d at 1164-65.
98. Id.
99. See Wiley, supra note 95, at 132 (arguing that the intrinsic test "implies that the jury's
gut governs copyright litigation" which is "a stance that would randomize results and could
please no one except copyright litigators and their heirs").
100. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, §13.03 (A)(1)(c); Wiley, supra note 95, at 132 (noting
that the Ninth Circuit itself may be abandoning this test now).
101. Broaddus, supra note 13, at 59. Cf. Wiley, supra note 95, at 132 (noting that "these
courts favor a single inquiry about 'substantial similarity' to which both lay and expert testimony
is admissible" because the "two-step analysis unrealistically assumes that factfinders can or will
forget what they learned in one step when applying the other").
102. See, e.g., E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp, 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1493 (D. Minn. 1985)
(applying the "iterative test" in a software infringement action). See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 10, § 13.03 (A)(1)(d) (criticizing this test as not protecting a plaintiff from copying that "does
not involve literal copying of code or direct translation" but praising its use of experts as a "step
in the proper direction").
103. Broaddus, supra note 13, at 59. See generally Wheelan Ass. Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab.,
797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986) (applying the test).
104. Broaddus, supra note 13, at 59-60.
105. Id. at 60.
106. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 13.03 (A)(1)(d).
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Hand's abstraction test with a process of filtration that is supposed to
result in a "core of protectible expression" against which the
defendant's work can be compared. 10 7 Some argue that, for software
cases, perhaps even greater than the threat of overprotection is the
"uncertainty created by the ad hoc nature" of these cases because
"[s]oftware developers have no adequate guidelines regarding what
level of independent development is required to avoid copyright
108
infringement."
Regardless of how well these tests may or may not work for
computer programming, they at least recognize the inapplicability of
the abstractions test to complex creations like computer software and
attempt to determine infringement from a more relevant perspective.
C. Intended Audience versus Lay Audience Standard
The difficulty in determining substantial similarity between
two works is compounded by the different audience standards that
courts apply. 10 9 Some courts apply the ordinary observer or "lay
observer" standard. 110 For instance, the court in Roth noted that
"even a casual observer" would find substantial similarity between the
cards in question. 1
The court seemed to imply that, if a casual
observer would readily recognize substantial similarity, an "ordinary
observer" would obviously find infringement. 11 2
Critics of this
standard note that courts that apply this standard often seem to
sweep up the "ordinary observer language" and apply it to the outcome
that they have already decided.1 13 Nimmer also notes that, while the
107. Broaddus, supra note 13, at 60-61 (favoring the approach because it involves a "single
filtration" as opposed to the "numerous approaches currently being used for separating the
protecible from the unprotectible elements of various types of works"). See also Computer
Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v Atari, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706-12 (2d Cir. 1992) (suggesting a three-step
approach based on the abstraction test that would combine abstraction, filtration and
comparison).
108. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 13.03 (A)(1)(d).
109. See id, at § 13.03. C.f. Broaddus, supra note 13, at 62-63 (noting that the "lay observer
test constitutes the final step in the copyright infringement analysis" once "ownership, access,
and copying have been established, and it is determined what elements of the plaintiffs work are
protectible").
110. See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946) (noting that expert witness
testimony should not be used to decide infringement, but should only be used to "assist in
determining the reactions of lay auditors").
111. Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970).
112. Id.
113. Some possible examples of this theory are, Costello v. Loew's Inc., 159 F. Supp 782, 789
(D. D.C. 1958) (finding that "[b]eyond any doubt, the ordinary viewer of Knights of the Round
Table who had read the The Sangreal would not get the impression that the defendant had
copied anything that is original with plaintiff from her drama" after discussing the various pieces
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Supreme Court did not expressly reject the use of the immediate
reaction of the ordinary observer in Feist, the standard "can play no
useful role" in analyzing and determining whether there has been
"copying of constituent elements that are original." 114
If Feist stands for the proposition that originality is the "sin
qua non"115 of copyright, the reaction of the ordinary observer may not
be appropriate in "detail[ing] how said copying was limited to
unprotected expression." 11 6 Instead, the important processes under
Feist are (1) the filtering out of original expression from unprotected
expression and (2) a comparison of these expressive elements. 117 The
lay audience standard is also questioned in its applicability to complex
works or works in which the ordinary audience lacks the required skill
to make comparisons.
Other courts, "recognizing the limitations" of the ordinary
observer standard, use an "intended audience" standard.1 18 In these
cases, courts substitute the ordinary observer with a "fact finder
possessing the requisite skill or knowledge necessary to fully
comprehend and understand the works under consideration."'1 9 It is
argued that this standard is not only useful for computer programs
but also in "cases dealing with musical works, advanced literary
works, and other works that are complex in nature." 120 In Kohus v.
Mariol, for example, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit used
the "intended audience" standard in order to determine if there was
substantial similarity between two drawings of latches made for
portable children's play-yards. 121 The court cited Feist and Nimmer to
maintain that the ordinary observer standard only applies where the
"lay audience's untutored judgment determines whether the product
which are protected and similar); Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad Co., Inc., 654 F.2d 204, 209-11
(2d Cir. 1981) (mentioning the "average lay observer" aspect of the test for substantial similarity,
but never referring to it again once the court dissects the elements of the TV show "The Greatest
American Hero" to determine it does not infringe on the plaintiffs copyright in "Superman").
114. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, §13.03 (B)(2)(c); Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
115. Feist Publ'ns,Inc., 499 U.S. at 345.
116. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 13.03 (B)(2)(c).
117. Id. Nimmer finds that the audience test therefore plays no useful role under Feist, and
should therefore be discarded due to its variable results and the "myriad exceptions in the way it
is applied." Id. He also notes that given the disagreement among the circuits and Supreme
Court silence, the issue is ripe for review. Id. C.f.,
Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc.,
720 F.2d 231, 245 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that surveys and opinion polls are problematic when
used for infringement actions because "an inference of copying sufficient to establish
infringement of a copyright is not a concept familiar to the public at large").
118. Broaddus, supra note 13, at 64-65.
119. Id. at 66.
120. Id.
121. 328 F.3d 848, 852 (6th Cir. 2003).
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will sell." 122 It reasoned that "in cases where the target audience
possesses specialized expertise ... it is appropriate ... to consider
similarity from the specialist's perspective." 123 The intended audience
standard may be more precise at extracting protected material from
unprotected material, but there still remains the problem of
determining the intended audience for a particular work. 124
IV. THE PARTICULAR PROBLEMS POSED BY POETRY

The variety of tests and the uncertainty in their applications
reflect the problems of determining substantial similarity when a type
of work does not lend itself to easy delineations of idea, expression, or
originality. Poetry is an example that falls into this uneasy territory.
Ezra Pound called poetry the "most concentrated form of verbal
expression." 125 It is a genre in which the very purpose of the author is
126
often to test the boundaries of the rational and the predictable.
This imaginative and unpredictable nature of poetry makes it even
more difficult to apply the infringement tests that courts currently
use.
Given copyright's purpose to protect original creation by
incentivizing additional creation, there should be infringement
"standard[s] [that] give substantial similarity meaning" and
1 27
predictability in order to avoid "unnecessary stifling of creativity."'
For poetry, as for other works, this standard should be predicated
upon how the writing operates as an expressive medium.

122. Id. at 854-57 (noting that Feist "favors an approach that involves reducing the
comparison to elements that are original" and that if the lay audience standard does not further
that goal, it must be either modified or discarded). See also Dawson v. Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731,
736 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding that when "conducting the second prong of the substantial similarity
inquiry, a district court must consider the nature of the intended audience of the plaintiffs
work").
123. Kohus, 328 F.2d at 857 (noting that in order to apply this standard, there must arise a
situation beyond "mere differences in taste and instead must rise to the level of the possession of
knowledge that the lay public lacks").
124. See, e.g., Warner Bros., Inc., 720 F.2d at 243 (using audience surveys of the TV show
"The Greatest American Hero" to determine that the intended audience was the average lay
observer which was for a "general audience of evening television viewers" notwithstanding that
fact that some viewers might not appreciate the humor).
125. EzRA POUND, ABC OF READING 36 (New Directions 1987).

126. See David Young, John Ashbery, in THE LONGMAN ANTHOLOGY OF CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN POETRY 162-63 (1989) (describing John Ashbery's experimental poetry which he finds
is "dedicated to liberating poetry from predictable conventions and tired traditions").
127. Laura G. Lape, The Metaphysics of The Law: Bringing Substantial Similarity Down to
Earth, 98 DICK. L. REV. 181, 182 (1994).

932

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
A.

[Vol. 58:3:915

What is a Poem?

The poet C.D. Wright notes that "[p]oetry without form is a
fiction." 128 A poem, unlike a piece of fiction or non-fiction, does not
simply tell or explain something through the use of sentences and
paragraphs. The author's selection, placement, and coordination of
words, space, punctuation, and sound produce meaning akin to a
painting or a musical composition. 129 For instance, each word in
Williams' poem is carefully chosen and aligned on the page in order to
reconstruct the reality of the red wheelbarrow as it existed in
Williams' vision.1 30 It is this artful attention to detail and intense
focus on a seemingly simple object that is the poem's quest.1 31 The red
wheelbarrow itself (as it exists in Williams' vision) is the point of the
poem.1 32 A poem's meaning, therefore, is not only tied to the words
used and traditional exposition, but also to the poem's form, sound,
and arrangement of words on the page, all of which create an
emotional response in the reader. 133
Poetry has often been described as appealing to both the
intellect and emotions of the reader. 134 Poetry, in a sense, uses
language to transcend language; "it may resemble language as we
ordinarily know and use it, but it transcends that use in its power to
express what we had thought inexpressible."'1 5 The poet Gregory Orr,
for instance, characterizes poetry as having four possible
temperaments that affect a poem's form; story (dramatic unity),
structure (measurable patterns), music (rhythm and sounds), and
imagination (flow of image to image or thought). 136 Wallace Stevens
described poets as "orator[s] whose speech sometimes resembles
music."' 3 7 For poetry, uniqueness is, therefore, something different
128. C.D. Wright, A Taxable Matter, in A FIELD GUIDE TO CONTEMPORARY POETRY AND
POETICS 240, 242 (Stuart Friebert et al., eds. 1997).
129. See Stuart Friebert, John Berryman, in THE LONGMAN ANTHOLOGY OF CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN POETRY 31 (1989) (noting that John Berryman's "Dream Songs" sounds "a little like a
xylophone played by a master musician").
130. FRANCES MAYES, THE DISCOVERY OF POETRY 426 (1987).
131. Id.

132. Id.
133. See generally, Gregory Orr, Order and Disorder in Lyric Poetry, in RICHER
ENTANGLEMENTS 24 (1993)(discussing how order and disorder contribute to the form a poem
eventually takes).
134. Holub, supra note 3, at 51.
135. David Young, Language, the Poet as Master and Servant, in A FIELD GUIDE TO
CONTEMPORARY POETRY AND POETICS, 189 (Stuart Friebert et al., eds. 1997).
136. Gregory Orr, Four Temperaments and the Forms of Poetry, in RICHER ENTANGLEMENTS
3-5 (1993).
137. Infra note 168, at 126.
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than what we might look for in a piece of fiction or in a play. A story
may be unique in its characterization, setting, words, exposition, or
dramatization.1 3 A poem's originality, on the other hand, stems from
its unique composition of words, form, sound, and content. 139 It is a
poet's original use of these elements that gives his poems both
particularized meaning and expression.140
B.

The Line in Poetry

One of the unique characteristics of poetry is the way in which
each individual line of a poem adds to the overall meaning or
expression of the poem.14 1 The poet William Matthews noted that,
unlike the line in prose which "is like a fishing line, cast out as far as
it will go straightforward," the line in poetry resembles a dance as it
"goes out from the margin, turns back, goes out again."'142 A line can
give "intellectual force" to isolated words in a poem.1 43 The poet's
choice of line breaks also creates emphasis on the words that end each
138. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1936)
(finding that a "play is the sequence of...conflicts... bound together in a unseparable unity").
139. See Shirley Kaufaman, Some Thoughts About Lines, in A FIELD GUIDE TO
CONTEMPORARY POETRY AND POETICS 91 (Stuart Friebert et al., eds. 1997) (finding that in
William Matthew's poetry it is not what he "says that counts as a work of art, it's what he
makes").
140. "[Meaning is not a set cut-off thing like the move of a knight on a chess-board. It comes
up with roots, with associations, with how and where the word is familiarly used ,or where it
has been used brilliantly or memorably." Orr, supra note 136, at 36-37 (explaining that meaning
can be created through sound, context, and groupings of words). See also Mayes, supra note 130,
at 45-47 (noting that the "best-formed poems function smoothly with, with oiled and well-fitted
parts"). Robert Creeley has said that unlike conversational speech, "the organization of poetry
has moved to a further articulation in which the rhythmic and sound structure now becomes not
only evident but a primary coherence in the total organization of what's being experienced."
Robert Creeley, With Linda Wagner, in TALES OUT OF SCHOOL 27 (1993).
141. "Poems are written in lines. The length of the line and where it breaks help establish
the poem's rhythm." Orr, supra note 136, at 5. See also John Haines, FurtherReflections on Line
and the Poetic Voice, in A FIELD GUIDE TO CONTEMPORARY POETRY AND POETICS 85 (Stuart
Friebert et al., eds. 1997) (finding that line breaks create "emotional charge" and come from the
energy or impulse of the poet").
142. William Matthews, A Note on Prose, Verse and the Line, in A FIELD GUIDE TO
CONTEMPORARY POETRY AND POETICS 92 (Stuart Friebert et al., eds. 1997). "The line most
obviously bodies forth the dance-the pause, the balance, and sudden motion .. " Donald Hall,
The Line, in A FIELD GUIDE TO CONTEMPORARY POETRY AND POETICS 88 (Stuart Friebert et al.,
eds. 1997). Some poetry does retain more prose-like characteristics and so the importance of the
line itself may be lessened somewhat where the poem's lines are long and discursive. On the
other hand, these types of poems are often rooted in traditional forms, such as the sonnet, and as
such the line takes on a meaning based on this tradition and "type." Even in these forms,
musicality can be dictated by line length or words that are chosen to begin or end the line. So,
while, even in prose-like poetry the line may appear more regular, the line's shape can dictate
meaning based on tradition, sound, or choice of word ends.
143. Id.
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line, while the space after each line creates a breath which gives
separate identity and importance to each single line. 144 In Williams'
The Red Wheelbarrow, for example, "so much depends/upon//a red
45
wheel/barrow//glazed with rain/water//beside the white chickens."'
Williams' chosen line breaks slow the reader down and make the
reader pay attention to each small line. This focused attention is part
of the meaning of this poem. 146 A red wheelbarrow might easily
escape many people's gaze. This poem uses the line breaks to slow the
reader down so that the reader does pay attention to the seemingly
mundane object, which may appear surprisingly beautiful or
strange. 147 Read as a piece of prose without its line breaks, the poem
loses its main point: "So much depends upon a red wheelbarrow glazed
with rain water beside the white chickens."' 48 A poem reprinted as
prose is no longer the careful, creative product of its author in which
49
emphasis, rhythm, and the visual impact of the poem are important. 1
Stanza breaks, punctuation, and techniques such as extra
spacing within a line also can contribute to the overall meaning of a
poem through rhythmic and visual resonance. 50 For instance, the
length of lines in a poem can create a rhythm "akin to the bar in
music."' 5' Long lines in a poem may create a slower, stretched-out
narrative beat, while short lines may create a quicker more bitten-off
feeling. 152 These rhythms create an emotional response in the reader
that has been likened to a dance that the reader engages in with the
poem. 153 A poem's sound combined with a poem's visual layout on the
page creates the total experience of the poem. 154 The poet Octavio

144. See MAYES, supra note at 130, at 5-6.
145. In poetry the "f' represents a line break and "If' represents a stanza break.
146. See, e.g., David Young, William Carlos Williams, in THE LONGMAN ANTHOLOGY OF
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POETRY 14-15 (Stuart Friebert et al., eds. 1989) (noting that form of
Williams' poetry parallels the "poet's vision of the world's beauty... manifesting [itself] in
unlikely ways").
147. See MAYES, supra note 130, at 426 (noting that William's careful timing of images "line
by line . . . makes a subtle case that an object itself is worth close attention").
148. Other writers have also expressed this sentiment using this poem as an example. Hall,
supra note 142, at 88; John Haines, FurtherReflections on Line and the Poetic Voice, in A FIELD
GUIDE TO CONTEMPORARY POETRY AND POETICS 85 (Stuart Friebert et al., eds. 1997).

149. Hall, supra note 142.
150. See MAYES, supra note 130, at 327 (noting that "form is the first thing you notice about
a poem").
151. Creeley, supra note 140, at 29.
152. Cf. Sandra McPherson, The Working Line, in A FIELD GUIDE TO CONTEMPORARY
POETRY AND POETICS 79 (Stuart Friebert et al., eds. 1997) (comparing the line in poetry to a
"conductor we watch").
153. Hall, supra note 142, at 88. "The line most obviously bodies forth the dance .. " Id.
154. MAYES, supra note 130, at 462.
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Paz, for example, uses form to create
experience:
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a visual and rhythmic

Poetry,
suspension bridge between history and truth,
is not a path toward this or that:
it is to see
the stillness in motion,
change
in stillness.
History is the path:
it goes nowhere,
we all walk it,
truth is to walk it.
We neither go nor come:
we are in the hands of time.
Truth:
to know ourselves,
from the beginning,
hung.
Brotherhood over the void.155
Paz creates "the illusion or illustration of space" with his
careful crafting of words on the page, and this created space evokes
156
emotion as artfully as the words in the poem.
The Red Wheelbarrow uses short lines to create a slow,
thoughtful rhythm, reinforcing the poem's purpose of articulating the
15 7
beauty that can be found in careful concentration on a single object.
For instance, "so much depends" makes the reader stop, and the
reader then starts and stops again with the next short line: "upon."
The poem's lines create a slow, hypnotic rhythm.15 8 This hypnosis
becomes a part of the poem's point as Williams works to make the
reader stop and notice the seemingly ordinary.1 59 The poet Fred
Chappell notes the importance of form in finding "new approaches to
old subjects," emphasizing that originality can be found in "new
combination of words and new arrangements of such poetic materials

155. San Idelefonso nocturne, in Fred Chappell, Paz, PLOW NAKED 130 (1993).
156. McPherson, supra note 152, at 76.
157. MAYES, supra note 130, at 426.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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"[p]oem is the form; the form is the poem.'
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For poetry, then, the

C. Word Choice
For poetry, as for other literary forms, the selection and
coordination of words is also of vital importance. 62 However, poetry's
condensed nature makes word choice and coordination especially
important as the poet chooses "words to fit the best sounds and sound
patterns to the subject." 163 Ezra Pound writes that "[t]he reader's first
and simplest test of [a poet] will be to look for words that do not
function; that contribute nothing to the meaning" or that distract the
reader from the central meaning in the poem. 164 A poem may tell a
story in one page, while a work of fiction may tell the same story over
the course of 100 or more pages. A poem may aim to reveal one
"aspect of the human condition," while a fiction piece may unfold
slowly and wander through varying introspections. 165
Poetry's
concentrated forms make every word crucial. Each word in a poem
carries an added weight and can swing the whole resonance or tone of
the poem in a new direction. 166 Therefore, "[a] fiery pepper on a clam
167
has consequences, as does a hot word in a cold poem."
The subject matter of the poem often dictates the choice of the
poet's words. For instance, in a poem about death, it might be
surprising to hear a light word such as "cherries" unless the writer
wished to create surprise or give a new emotion or resonance to the
poem. 168 In The Red Wheelbarrow, Williams uses common, simple
words such as "a red wheelfbarrow//glazed with rain/water" to
illustrate the beauty of simple objects.1 69 His choice of straightforward
and simple words is crucial to the emotional resonance of the poem. If
Williams had used emotionally charged descriptors of his red
wheelbarrow, the focus of the poem would have shifted from the red
160. Chappell, supra note 155, at 26-27.
161. MAYES, supra note 130, at 327. "The poem's form and content are totally interactive
systems. Form without balanced content is hollow; content without form is chaos." Id.
162. MAYES, supra note 130, at 33.
163. See Holub, supra note 3, at 50-51 (noting that poetry as compared to other
communications is a concentrated form with a "specific high inner intensity").
164. POUND, supra note 125, at 63.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 37 (detailing the nuanced meaning words can have).
167. MAYES, supra note 130, at 46.
168. See id. For a discussion of the emotional authenticity of word choice and poetry, see
WALLACE STEVENS, THE NECESSARY ANGEL 112-113 (1951).

169. See Young, supra note 146, at 14-15 (discussing Williams' style).
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wheelbarrow to the personality or emotional geography of the poem's
speaker. 70 For instance, if Williams had described the wheelbarrow
as "youthful red" or "sparkling with diamonds of rain water," the
reader's focus moves away from the wheelbarrow itself toward the
connotations of "youthful," "sparkling," and "diamonds." 17 1 In The Red
Wheelbarrow, Williams carefully avoids words that intrude the
personality of the poet or his particular mood on the pure actuality of
the wheelbarrow. 172 In sharp contrast to Williams, Louis MacNeice's
poem, Snow, uses a variety of simple and complex words to create a
dizzying experience:
World is crazier and more of it than we think,
Incorrigibly plural. I peel and portion
A tangerine and spit the pips and feel
173
The drunkenness of things being various.
Poetry is a "master[ing] of the possibilities of language.' 7 4
This mastering of language is not something that simply happens; it is
a process linked simultaneously to both the present and the past.
Poets read other poems and use the past as a springboard while also
drawing from their present sense of language and the world. 75 Thus,
a "new poem fulfills the old habits of expectation in some unexpected
way."'176 Authors can use what has come before to launch their own
unique perspectives. 77 This use of the past to create new poems
creates a tension with traditional notions of originality. Mark Rose
hypothesizes that, "[t]he persistence of the discourse of original genius
implicit in the notion of creativity. . . obscures the fact that cultural

170. See MAYES, supra note 130, at 426 (contrasting Keats's and Neruda's way of describing
objects).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 310. For a discussion of the importance of word choice and syntax in a poem by
Keats, see Gregory Orr, Order and Disorder in Lyric Poetry, in RICHER ENTANGLEMENTS 26-29
(1993) (finding that Keats' "rhetoric" and "elaborate syntax... are meant to disorder and
disorient the recipient").
174. Young, supra note 135, at 188 (referring to the poet Charles Wright as an example of a
poet whose abilities in this regard were of a "very high order").
175. See, e.g., Donald Hall, Goatfoot, Milktongue, Twinbird: The Psychic Origins of Poetic
Form, in A FIELD GUIDE TO CONTEMPORARY POETRY AND POETICS 25 (Stuart Friebert et al., eds.
1997) (articulating the poet's process).
176. Id. at 26.
177. For an outline of historical ideas of authorship, including the origins of the phrase
"dwarfs on the shoulders of giants," see Rebecca Moore Howard, Some Events and Ideas in the
History of Authorship in the West, at http://wrt-howard.syr.edu/Handouts/ChronAuth.html (last
visited May 1, 2005).
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production is always a matter of appropriation and transformation."' 178
In poetry, transformation can occur at many levels, such as form,
sound, tone, or image. 179 It is a poem's attention to the "shining
particulars" of language and form that make a poem unique or
original despite the fact that its subject may have been written about
18 0
many times before.
Because a poem's original expression resides in a particular
combination of words, sounds, and form and because copyright seeks
to protect original expression, 8 1 it should protect all of these original
82
elements in a poem. The current tests for copyright infringement
fail to account for the unique aspects of poetry and, therefore, do not
adequately protect the original expression of a poem. 8 3 This failure to
adequately characterize the original expression in a poem not only
inadequately protects a poem's originality, but it also prevents other
poems from borrowing elements which, when divorced from their
form, would not necessarily be original.8 4 These problems are best
illustrated by applying the substantial similarity tests that courts
currently use to The Red Wheelbarrow.
V. THE CURRENT TESTS FOR SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY DO NOT WORK
FOR POETRY

Judge Learned Hand's famous abstractions tests seeks to distill
expression from ideas in a given work, "but it does not tell us where in
any given work the level of abstraction is such as to cross the line from
expression to idea."' 8 5 Thus, in looking at The Red Wheelbarrow, the
first step in determining improper appropriation would be to decide
178. MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 135 (1993).

179. See infra Part III.
180. C.D. Wright, A

Taxable Matter, in A FIELD GUIDE OF CONTEMPORARY POETRY AND

POETICS 240-41 (Stuart Friebert et al., eds 1997) (finding that it is poetry that "notes on the
barely perceptible disappearances from our world such as that of the sleeping porch or the root
cellar").
181. See generally Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Snyder, 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (discussing copyright
protection). Mark Rose calls this original expression the "personality" of the author, and quotes
Locke to explain that this personal expression is created when the author "removes materials
from the state of nature and mixes his labor with them, thereby producing an item of personal
property." ROSE, supra note 178, at 114.

182. The current tests for substantial similarity. See infra Part III.
183. See generally Rotstein, supra note 14 (arguing that copyright should make room for the
insights of literary criticism and that the failure to understand different types of texts and how
they work, is a failure to characterize the copyrightable elements within them).
184. "[I]f
we expand protection too broadly or in unproductive ways, creativity may be
stymied by constraining the use and interplay of ideas." Monrie E. Price & Malla Pollack, The
Author in Copyright:Notes for the Literary Critic, 10 CARDOzo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 703, 706 (1992).
185. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, §13.03.

2005]

COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND POETRY

939

what in Williams' poem is protectible original expression. In Sheldon,
Judge Hand1 6differentiated "general patterns" or "themes" from
"expression."'
In that case, Hand found that the defendants had
taken too much because they had used the same scenes, social classes,
and "parallelism of incident," all of which infringed on the dramatic
87
significance of the first play.
The dramatic significance of The Red Wheelbarrow lies not only
in words used, which are seemingly innocuous, but in the pattern of
short lines and stanzas and in how the words break slowly over the
page to create the 8surprisingly beautiful image of a wheelbarrow
"glazed" with rain. 8 It is clear that Williams could not claim
copyright in any of the words in this poem individually. It also is clear
that the idea of a poem with short lines that make the reader dwell
more carefully on individual words cannot be copyrighted.' 8 9 Nor
could Williams claim copyright in the idea of a wheelbarrow or a
mundane object being beautiful. 190 In Nichols, Judge Hand noted that
there was a point at which an idea could become clothed in expression
and therefore copyrightable.' 9' But as noted earlier, Hand refused to
fix this point and indicated that "nobody ever can."' 92 At what point,
then, do Williams' form, words, and combination of words working
toward a meaning deserve protection under the abstractions test? It
is unclear if half of Williams' words used in a different form or all of
his words in a different form and order would be an infringement.
The point of Hand's test is to move from general patterns to a
more "specific level of abstraction." 193 In The Red Wheelbarrow, a
general pattern might be the idea of using a poem to focus attention
on the ordinary. A more specific level of abstraction might include a
poem that invokes this idea in the specific context of a wheelbarrow,
or maybe even more specifically, a red wheelbarrow. The problem is
that a poem with a red wheelbarrow, even if it were "glazed" with

186. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936).
187. Id. at 55-56.
188. See MAYES supra note 130, at 426 (describing Williams' wheelbarrow as a "watercolor
image").
189. See POUND, supra note 125, at 69 (noting that in "Provence it was [once] considered
plagiarism to take a man's form").
190. Ideas are not copyrightable. See generally infra Part II.
191. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
192. Id.
193. Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 683 F.2d 610, 624 (2d Cir. 1982) (using the
abstractions test to determine if there is substantial similarity between plaintiffs book about
Tarzan and defendant's movie). Hand, in Sheldons, notes that a play might be pirated "without
using the dialogue" because "[sipeech is only a small part of a dramatist's means of
expression..." 81 F.2d at 55.
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rain, might have a completely different tone or personality than
Williams' poem. A poem might wish to express the same general idea
of The Red Wheelbarrow and might even include a red wheelbarrow,
but could use different words, a different form, or both. 194 A poet who
copied or tried to copy every bit of dramatic significance' 95 that he
could find in The Red Wheelbarrow but who used different words or a
different form would create a new poem in which new choices
represented his originality as an author. 196 The abstractions test
provides no way of delineating between a poem that is a wholly new
197
creation and one which is impermissibly similar to an earlier poem.
In failing to take into account all the expressive elements available to
poetry, the abstractions test ignores real and important differences,
such as tone or rhythm, that might occur between two poems on a
similar subject. This method of abstracting expression therefore is too
imprecise to provide any accuracy or predictability when applied to
poetry. 198
The total concept and feel test, as introduced in Roth' 99 and
refined in Sid & Mary Krofft, 200 likewise fails to allow for poetry's
intermingling of form and function. First, the vague scope of "total
concept and feel" probably would create overly broad copyright
protection when applied to a poem like The Red Wheelbarrow.20 1 For
example, the total concept of The Red Wheelbarrow might be found to
be the idea of beauty in the ordinary. 20 2 The total feel of the poem
could be articulated as the use of a few, simple words to make the
reader focus attention on one object. 20 3 Another poet could use both

194. For a discussion of the relationship between personality, value, and original authorship,
see ROSE, supra note 181, at 120-21.
195. See Sheldon, 81 F.2d at 55 (applying the test).
196. David Walker, Stone Soup: Contemporary Poetry and the Obsessive Image, in A FIELD
GUIDE TO CONTEMPORARY POETRY AND POETICS 172-77 (Stuart Friebert et al., eds 1997).
197. Cf. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, §13.03. Robert Rotstein also criticizes Nichols'
explication of the idea/expression dichotomy by noting that often courts equate idea with
convention and expression with "modulation of convention," ignoring the realities of genre or how
particular types of texts function. Rotstein, supra note 14, at 750-85.
198. For an argument that internal consistency should be a goal of copyright, see Ralph S.
Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protection:A Search for PrincipledStandards, 70 MINN. L. REV.
579, 607-09 (1985). The patterns test, discussed infra likewise fails to take into account sound,
tone, and visual impression as expressive elements.
199. Roth Greeting Cards v, United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970).
200. Sid & Mary Krofft Television Prod., Inc. v. McDonald Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th
Cir. 1977).
201. Broaddus, supra note 13, at 58.
202. This is a simplistic rendering of a possible interpretation of this poem.
203. See infra Part III.
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the concept and feel of The Red Wheelbarrow and yet create a poem
nothing like Williams'. Consider this poem by Walt Whitman:
The Runner
On a flat road runs the well-train'd runner,
He is lean and sinewy with muscular legs,
He is thinly clothed, he leans forward as he runs,
20 4
With lightly closed fists and arms partially rais'd.
In both Whitman's poem and in The Red Wheelbarrow, the
images described are ordinary and realistic. 2 5 If a court defined The
Red Wheelbarrow's "total concept and feel" as above, it could likewise
define Whitman's The Runner to have a substantially similar concept
and feel.
Obviously these poems are nothing alike; they are
drastically different in form, actual word choice, and image. 20 6 It could
be argued that this example is an exaggeration of the total concept
and feel test's problems since no reasonable person would ever
conclude that those two poems are substantially similar. However,
the point is that "total concept and feel" provides little guidance. This
is especially true in a case where almost anyone would agree that two
poems are not substantially similar, but where an articulation of both
poems' "total concept and feel" might reveal surprising overlap. A
poem with a red wheelbarrow in it that was also about beauty in the
ordinary, could be just as different from The Red Wheelbarrow as is
The Runner.20 7 Therefore, in a case where two poems share more in
regard to theme or word choice, it becomes critical to decide the exact
meaning of "total concept and feel."
Sid & Mary Krofft's extrinsic-intrinsic articulation of the total
concept and feel test does little to improve the precision of substantial
similarity applied to poetry. 20 8 While this test allows for "analytical
dissection and expert testimony" in the first, extrinsic step of the test,
that step looks only for substantial similarity of ideas and not for
similarity of expression. 20 9 If substantial similarity of ideas is found,

204. MAYES, supra note 130, at 93.
205. See id. at 82 (discussing the use of literal images in poetry).
206. For the argument that poetry is not written with concepts or ideas, but with words,
which, when carefully selected, achieve an "evocative effect, partly as image, partly as woven
texture of movement, sound, and the energy released by imaginative juxtaposition," see Young,
supra note 135, at 186-91.
207. See MAYES, supra note 130, at 426 (contrasting the styles and meanings of different
poems that closely examine specific objects).
208. Sid & Mary Krofft Television Prod., Inc., 562 F.2d at 1164.
209. Id.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:3:915

the trier of fact then must decide if there is similarity of expression. 210
Therefore, the second, intrinsic step is the equivalent of the total
concept and feel test. When asked to evaluate the substantial
similarity of ideas between two poems, an expert poet might be hardpressed to decide which concepts to compare. For example, should an
expert comparing a poem to The Red Wheelbarrow focus on the
concept of a simple form, on the poem's praise of the ordinary, or on
the poem's use of ordinary words to show that something is beautiful?
In Sid & Mary Krofft, the court noted that the determination
"of whether there is similarity in ideas may often be a simple one."21 '
It used the example of a nude statue, explaining that a "statue of a
horse or a painting of a nude" would not "embody this [same] idea."2 12
But these examples articulate difference only when either the subject
or the medium is completely different. This approach still leaves
another poem about a red wheelbarrow open to accusations of
substantial similarity of ideas. Then,
is left to the "ordinary
reasonable person" to determine whether there is substantial
similarity of expression. 213 Here, as with the "total concept and feel"
test, the trier of fact has little guidance as to what constitutes
infringement other than his own particular predisposition or
instincts.214
The new approaches that some courts have taken in assessing
substantial similarity in complex cases 215 are mostly limited to
analysis of technology or computer programming. 216 The filtration
test, for example, aims to filter out all of the unprotectible elements of
a work and then to compare the protectible expression with the
allegedly infringing work. 217 In Computer Ass'n Internationalv. Altai,
Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit first filtered out such
"elements as those dictated by efficiency, hardware requirements, and
mechanical specifications" as well as "elements that [the court] found
to be in the public domain." 218 But unlike a computer program, poetry
is a "structuring of thought and emotion" through the use of the line,

210. Id.
211. Sid & Mary Krofft Television Prod., Inc., 562 F.2d at 1164.
212. Id. The court also notes that the expert might consider things such as "the subject
matter, and the setting." Id.
213. Id.
214. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, §13.03 (A)(1)(c) (discussing the "Total Concept
and Feel Test").
215. See infra Part II.
216. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, §13.03(e).
217. See Broaddus, supra note 13, at 61 (discussing the filtration process).
218. Id.
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overall form, word choice, and sound. 219 InThe Red Wheelbarrow, any
filtering changes the meaning of the poem. If, for example, all the
common words 220 were filtered out, there would be little if anything
left of the poem. 22 1 The idea of a simple poem about an ordinary
subject could be filtered out because ideas are not copyrightable, but
the poem still would stand as a whole unit. The poem's words, sounds,
form, and lines all make the poem original and therefore the
222
particular property of its author.
The ordinary observer or lay audience standards, which
223
generally rely on the immediate reaction of the reasonable person,
provide little or no protection for a poet like Williams whose work is
minimal and subtle.
Nimmer notes that the "immediate and
spontaneous observations of a person untrained" in a complex subject
or literary form "may fail to note similarities that, if analyzed and
dissected, would be only too apparent."224 Thus, a trier of fact
unfamiliar with poetry might find nothing special about Williams'
word choice or form and may deem another poem about a red
wheelbarrow in the rain to be an infringement only because it
contains a similar image or subject matter. A determination like this
would fail to account for the range of expressive elements that poetry
offers. This failure would result in a dismissal of many of the truly
original or creative elements of a poem.
Even the intended audience test, created in response to the
limitations of the ordinary observer test, provides little certainty for a
poem such as The Red Wheelbarrow. 225 First, the intended audience
for this poem is unclear. It might be the general public, other poets, or
experienced literary readers in general. If the poem is meant for a
general audience, the intended audience is the ordinary observer and,
thus, the ordinary observer test applies. 226 If the poem is for other
poets or for those who have experience with the subtleties of poetry,
219. Haines, supra note 141, at 85.
220. A case that discusses the non-protectibility of ordinary words or phrases in reference to
literary works is Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 911-12 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing other cases
which do not protect ordinary phrases).
221. Perhaps the word "glazed" or the phrase "glazed/with rain water" would remain.
222. ROSE, supra note 178, at 113-25.

223. NIMMER & NIMMER , supra note 10, §13.03. These tests are the dominant and
traditional tests for improper appropriation. Id; see also Broaddus, supra note 13, at 62 (noting
that the traditional test is the lay observer test).
224. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, §13.03.

225. Broaddus, supra note 13, at 64-65.
226. See B. MacPaul Stanfield, Finding the Fact of Familiarity:Assessing JudicialSimilarity
Tests in Copyright Infringement Actions, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 489, 505 (2001) (citing Dawson v.
Hinshaw Music as an example of a case which found the intended audience to be the general
public).
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the intended audience provides no guidance to the trier of fact in
assessing similarity for the purposes of copyright infringement. A
poet may have a refined notion of what makes a poem original 227 but
no notion of when another poem impermissibly infringes on another
for copyright purposes. Poets chosen to determine infringement might
also have different ideas of ownership and creativity that do not relate
at all to the purposes of copyright. 228 Copyright infringement suits
regarding poetry need a substantial similarity test that accounts for
both the unique aspects of poetry and copyright's purpose of providing
a creative incentive for the public benefit.

VI. A SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY TEST FOR POETRY
Order is the shape upon which beauty depends
229
Pearl S. Buck
I propose a test by which to determine improper appropriation
of poetry that considers all of the expressive elements available in this
particular genre. 230 I will call this test the "Expressive Elements
Test." This test would compare two poems based on their word choice,
form, and arrangement of, words. Courts already have a standard for
infringement that takes into account a work's selection, coordination,
and arrangement, but this standard is only applied to factual or
historical works and is considered thin protection. 231 That standard is
not so much a test for infringement as it is a scope of protection based
23 2
upon copyright's requirement of originality.
Because copyright only protects original elements of a work
and facts are not considered original, a work that consists mainly of

227. Even this standard varies wildly from poet to poet. See, e.g., Young, supra note 135
(exploring the different qualities of language that characterize modern poetry).
228. See, e.g., Walker, supra note 196, at 174-75 (showing how different poets can interpret
and measure the quality and originality of poems differently).
229. To MY DAUGHTERS, WITH LOVE 1967, available at http://www.quotelady.comlauthors
/author-b.html#Buck (last updated Mar. 28, 2004).
230. Cf. Jeannette Rene Busek, Copyright Infringement: A proposal for a New Standardfor
Substantial Similarity Based on the Degree of Possible Expressive Variation, 45 UCLA L. REV.
1777, 1795 (1998) (arguing that it "makes more sense to consider the degree of expressive
variability available to the author given the type of work in question" than to trying to establish
a fixed standard).
231. See generally Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Snyder, 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (asserting that "the
copyright in a factual compilation is thin").
232. See id. at 348-49 (Originality remains the sine quo non of copyright; accordingly,
copyright protection may extend only to those components of a work that are original to the
author.").
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facts is entitled to limited protection. 23 3 In Feist, the Supreme Court
held that factual compilations could be protected in copyright only in
their "selection and arrangement" and that the compilation's selection
2 34
and arrangement must possess a requisite degree of originality.
The Supreme Court called this protection for factual compilations
"inevitably" thin because "a subsequent compiler is free to use the
facts contained in another's publication to aid in preparing a
competing work, so long as the competing work does not feature the
same selection and arrangement." 235 Nimmer refers to this protection
236
for factual works as protection of the "literal form of expression."
The Expressive Elements Test will consider not only the
selection of particular words, but also their coordination and
Originality in copyright does not
arrangement on the page.
necessitate invention nor "the production of something that did not
exist in the prior art. ' 237 However, copyright protection extends only
to creative expression. 238 Since the originality standard has been
interpreted liberally, it makes sense, in order to carefully limit the
sweep of copyright protection, to describe creative expression in
reference to a genre's possibilities. Since a poem's meaning is often
tied to its "literal form," it makes sense to protect a poem at this
concrete level rather than to attempt to articulate and distinguish an
idea from the expression in the poem. When this form-conscious level
of protection is applied to poetry it protects the expressive elements
available in a poem, and is not a "thin" protection; rather, this
standard provides fuller protection than any of the other substantial
similarity tests in current use.
Since copyright does not protect ideas, it follows that copyright
should aim to "protect the meaning embedded within a work less
rigorously than it protects a work's literal elements." 239 Copyright's
originality requirement attempts to "ensure the presence of the

233. "Facts may be discovered, but they are not created by an act of authorship." NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 10, § 2.11.
"Not every selection, coordination, or
234. Feist Publ'ns Inc., 499 U.S. at 348, 358.
arrangement will pass muster." Id. at 358.
235. Id. at 349. In Feist, the Supreme Court also rejected the notion of protecting an author's
"sweat of the brow" or protecting the hard work of compiling facts or information which copyright
does not protect. Id. at 353-55.
236. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra notel0, § 2.11.
237. BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 42 (1967).

238. Feist Publ'ns Inc, 499 U.S. at 349.
239. Kurtz, supra note 17, at 1232. Kurtz also notes that the ultimately vague line between
idea and expression makes it impossible to clearly delineate a work's unprotectible elements and
thus a work's "perceiver ...will need to make judgments and evaluations." Id. at 1233.
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author's personality in the work" 240 so that protection is only given to
what was created by the author. 241 Originality in poetry stems from
the interplay of a poet's word choice, his coordination of words to
242
create meaning and sound, and the final visual form of the poem.
The ideas in a poem are often tied irretrievably to the poem's form or
unique combination of words. 243 Since originality in poetry is this
process of creating meanings from surprising or unique combinations
of words, 244 the Expressive Elements Test provides poets more than
just thin copyright protection.
The Expressive Elements Test could use a sliding scale to
assess substantial similarity. This test would protect the combination
of elements that make a poem like The Red Wheelbarrow unique
without turning to an abstract determination of the poem's "total
concept and feel" 245 and without leaving the poem protected only from
exact copying. 246 Specifically, the more similarity that exists with
respect to one element, such as the poem's form, the less allowance
47
there might be for similarity between the poems' choice of words.
For example, a poem that used the form of Williams' poem and most of
the same words might be found substantially similar with the use of a
sliding scale. On the other hand, either a poem that used the same
form but none of the same words or a poem that used most of the same
words in a completely different form probably would not be an
248
infringement under this standard.

240. Durham, supra note 28, at 621.
241. The court in Feist notes that this is necessary so that authors can be assured the "right
to their original expression" and so that others can be encouraged "to build freely on the ideas
and information conveyed by the work." 499 U.S at 349-50.
242. See infra Part V.
243. " 'I want my word to be the thing itself, created by my soul a second time."' Mayes,
supranote 130, at 82 (quoting Jime'nez).
244. "The poem can be generated by a vocable in common use and suddenly perceived gorged
can also be generated by the sight of a simple object, never before
with all its meaning ....[i]t
seen in such a way...." Jean Follain, Meanings of Poetry, in A FIELD GUIDE TO CONTEMPORARY
POETRY AND POETICS 117, 117 (Stuart Friebert et al., eds 1997).
245. Neil Boorstyn, Recent Cases and Developments, 27 COPYRIGHT L. J. 12 (Jan.-Feb. 2003)
(noting that "[a]s a test for infringement, 'total concept and fell' is essentially meaningless unless
comparison of the works demonstrates substantial similarity of protected expression").
246. See infra Part II (discussing the two-step process for improper appropriation).
247. The use of a sliding scale is already used in copyright to determine the first step in
copyright infringement; copying. This standard is called the inverse ratio rule and allows for a
finding of copying in fact if there is some access and more similarity or vice versa. BROWN &
DENICOLA, supra note 6, at 223-24.
248. So that: "So much depends upon a blue wheelbarrow glazed
with streaks of rain water sitting beside
the newly-hatched chickens."
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The
Expressive
Elements
test
eliminates
arbitrary
determinations for substantial similarity and makes allowances for
various types of poetry. Mark Rose's comparison of two compositions
to two human faces is an especially apt analogy for poetry, where both
"may resemble each other in various ways, but will always have some
249 Just
distinguishable characteristics, some marks of individuality."
as one face may resemble another because of its bone structure, yet
create a completely different overall impression because of other
differences such as coloring or age, two poems may have similar
features but should not be considered substantially similar as
complete compositions. To focus only on the words of a poem or on
such vague formulations as "total concept and feel" is to fail to
250
understand all the elements that make a poem distinctive.
William's choice of words in The Red Wheelbarrow is part of
what makes his poem distinctive: "glazed with rain water beside the
white chickens." The form of Williams's poem and the line breaks
throughout play an equally important role:
glazed with rain
water
beside the white
chickens.
Williams could have formed the lines as such:
glazed
with rain water beside
the white chickens
This formulation of the poem ignores Williams' emphasis on
the images of "rain" and "white" and transforms the tone of "glazed"
from soft to hard. The Expressive Elements Test used on a sliding
scale of similarity between word choice and form would still function
to protect poems that are more discursive or prose-like. 251 Attention to
a poet's selection, arrangement, and coordination of words with the
252
use of a sliding scale would equally protect these types of poems

Is not substantially similar to The Red Wheelbarrow. A "total concept and feel" test used on this
poem might have a different outcome.
249. ROSE, supra note 181, at 125.

250. It is to demonstrate "one kind of distinctiveness at the expense of another." Id. at 126.
251. Prose poetry itself is hard to categorize and consists of various styles. See id. (noting
that some prose poems "have a relaxed appearance, skipping lines or including conversation"
while others may be dense, and this density and/or lack of white space can give an "implosive
quality to the subject").
252. For examples of prose-like poetry, see Mayes, supra note 140, at 360-85.
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because the "block of prose is the form." 253 Consider these lines by
Walt Whitman:
I hear America singing, the varied carols I hear,
Those of mechanics, each one singing his as it should be blithe
and strong,
A poem that used every word of Whitman's would probably be
found substantially similar. On the other hand, a poem that used only
some of the words with a different form would probably not be
substantially similar:
I hear
Mexico dancing, the varied
Dances.
I hear,
The farmers, each one
Dancing.
And this as it should be
Wildly strong.
Regard for a poem's form as well as its word selection allows
poets to create poems which are uniquely their own, while still giving
them leeway to draw and build upon poetry that has come before. 254
The Expressive Elements Test also would help to eliminate
aesthetic judgments and random line-drawing in substantial
similarity determinations of poetry. 255 Justice Holmes condemned the
notion of judges imposing their aesthetic values onto works because
not only would "some works of genius ... be sure to miss appreciation"
but also because works which "appealed to a public less educated than
a judge" might be undervalued. 256 A court that relies on the
abstractions method or a poem's "total concept and feel" to determine
substantial similarity "can reveal nothing more than [that] court's

253. MAYES, supra note 130, at 360.
254. "The literary form of poems is created largely by learning .... [p]ossible resolutions of
metaphor, diction, and sound are coded into memory from our reading of other poets,
occasionally from our reading of criticism, from our talk with other poets .... [n]ew resolutions
are combinations of parts of old ones, making new what may later be combined again and made
new again." Hall, supra note 175, at 25.
255. Cf. Geller, supra note 21, at 231 (noting the tension in copyright stemming from the
imprecision with which courts have distinguished idea from expression and "new works from
prior works").
256. Bleinstein v. Donaldson Lithography Co., 188 U.S.239, 251-52 (1903).
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preconceptions" 257 of what makes two poem's similar. Copyright tries
to avoid aesthetic judgments when determining if a work is eligible to
be copyrighted by allowing a minimal amount of creativity to
suffice. 2 58 Courts should also avoid aesthetic judgments in tests for
improper appropriation of poetry by focusing on the "literal form of
expression" 259 and not the inconsistent standards reflected in the tests
260
currently used.
When considering a poem like The Red Wheelbarrow, a court
using the Expressive Elements Test would no longer have to
determine the "ideas" of the poem and then separate those ideas from
the poem's protectible expression. The trier of fact could instead
compare the similarities of language and form to determine if an
alleged infringing poem is impermissibly similar.
While the
Expressive Elements Test concededly would still involve an inherent
amount of subjectivity in determining whether two poems are
substantially similar, 261 this test at least provides some predictability
by allowing the context of poetry to function as an operative element
262
in any determination of copyright infringement.
Predictability is important because it allows authors to
understand the limits of their protectible expression and the
boundaries of acceptable borrowing from prior works. If copyright
overprotects, it may stifle new creation by preventing authors from
experimenting with prior texts, ideas, and forms to create their own
new poems. 263 For example, a poet who admires Williams' poetry
might decide not to create his own version of a poem about a red

257. Lunney, supra note 25, at 506-09 (noting that some courts "have relied on a form of
metaphysical dart throwing to identify" the level of protection a work should be given).
258. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, §3.04[2] (noting that "the threshold for
originality is low"); see also Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's
Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 38-39 (2002) (noting that the constitution does not
discriminate between high art and low are and that central to this notion is the problem that
"judges are not art critics" and "that even art critics cannot say what is art and what is not").
259. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, §2.11.
260. Alfred C. Yen notes that when judges use their aesthetic tastes to make determinations
artists might "prefer creating works that meet the aesthetic judgments of judges because other
works would either not get the benefits of copyright protection or wind up being suppressed."
Copyright Opinionsand Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247, 248-49 (1998).
261. A trier of fact would still have to ultimately decide when two works are substantially
similar, this test just provides a basis for determining that level.
262. "The question becomes for copyright whether the law can adequately identify those
factors that allow an audience to react consistently to a particular work, such that triers of fact
can meaningfully compare two works to determine whether infringement has occurred."
Rotstein, supra note 14, at 726.
263. See Geller, supra note 21, at 260-61 (questioning at what point "too much protection
would strifle cultural feedback").
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wheelbarrow for fear that he will infringe on Williams' work. 264 The

poet may intend a poem that reveals aspects of his childhood in a city
devoid of red wheelbarrows, ultimately bringing his perspective to a
subject embedded in his literary heritage. 265 Instead of being stifled
by fear of misappropriation, writers should be free to "study and
cultivate themselves" so that they can build upon the past and "find
the distinctiveness of their works and the right to call themselves
authors."266 The tricky distinction between idea and expression, which
John Whicher describes as "one of the hardest problems to solve in the
law of copyright," 267 is alleviated by a comparison that focuses on
similarity of form and word selection instead of abstraction. The
Expressive Elements Test, when applied to poetry, should protect
poetry at a level more consistent with the expectations of both those
poets who put their works into circulation and those who borrow from
26 8
pre-existing works.
This new standard also would help eliminate differing
outcomes based on a court's choice of audience standard and would
avoid a subjective determination of the intended audience for a
particular poem. 269 A lay audience or an expert audience could
calculate both substantial similarity of word choice and selection and
arrangement of the page. It would not make much difference which
audience is used; an expert and a lay audience could easily reach the
same conclusion as to substantial similarity in word choice, form, or a
combination of both. In The Red Wheelbarrow, for example, Williams'
word choice is clear for all: he chose the word "glazed" instead of a
word like wet; he choose the word "red" to describe the wheelbarrow;
he chose the to describe the chickens as "white"; and so on. Any type
of audience could compare the word arrangements or phrasings. All
types of audiences also could compare the overall shapes of the
264. This is assuming that Steven's poem was not in the public domain.
265. See, e.g., Walker, supra note 196, at 171-73 (discussing the reoccurrence of certain
images in poetry, such as the stone, and noting that what makes a particular poem effective or

not is how well the poem "marks out the territory of inward vision" so that the "image is
integrally related to the impulse behind it").
266. ROSE, supra note 178, at 117.
267. WHICHER, supra note 21, at 121.
268. It is more consistent with poet's expectations because most poets create poems with the
understanding that form and content are inseparably linked and that language's "possibilities
are multitudinous." Young, supra note 135, at 196. "Indeed the concept of copyright is enriched
and rationalized by an approach that provides some legal substance to the concept of

authorship." Monroe E. Price & Malla Pollack, The Author in Copyright: Notes for the Literary
Critic, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 703, 713 (noting, however, that the intention of the author
is to "profit from the system").
269. Is, for instance, a poem by an accessible poet like Robert Frost intended more for a
general audience then a poem by Ezra Pound?

2005]

COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENTAND POETRY

951

poems, the line breaks, and stanza breaks. While this test does not
provide a systematic equation which can be used with complete
objectivity in every infringement case, it does at least create a
standard from which the expressive elements of poetry can be
compared with equal effectiveness by both lay and expert audiences. 27°
When applied to poetry, the Expressive Elements Test also
would better effectuate the purposes of the Copyright Clause. The
Supreme Court has stated that copyright protection is not based on a
natural or moral right but instead is a "limited grant" intended to
incentivize authors to create for the public benefit. 271 "[E]xpression is
protected so that authors will develop new facts and ideas for the
betterment of the public." 2 72 This benefit to the public is also a benefit
to authors. Poets create by building upon the ideas and genius of prior
works. 273 Word choice and form in poetry are ideas as well as
particular expressions of personality. A poet has taken too much of
the expression of a prior work when the poet has not built upon it, but
274 Just
instead has built around it or has not built anything himself.
as a building is not completely created out of newly invented
materials, so a poem makes use of materials that have been developed
and introduced to the literary marketplace over time. The Expressive
Elements Test protects what a poet has built while allowing the ideas
and building materials of the poem to freely circulate back into the
public domain.
The Supreme Court's articulated aim for copyright is to provide
an economic incentive to authors to create, but the Court "occasionally
adopts statements which reflect copyright's roots in fairness and
justice. '275 Since courts seek to balance creative incentive with public
optimal public benefit, their application of copyright law should not be
arbitrary or based on personal aesthetics. Any determination of
infringement should be based upon an understanding of a work's
possible expression. Also, since poetry inevitably draws from works of
the past, there needs to be some method to evaluate what it is that the
author is "using" versus what the author has added to the literary

270. Cf. Busek, supra note 230, at 1781 (arguing for substantial similarity tests which reflect
the "expressive variation" possible in a given subject).
271. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
272. Jon M. Garon, Normative Copyright:A Conceptual Framework for Copyright Philosophy
and Ethics, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1278, 1278 (2003).
273. See Hall, supra note 175, at 25.
274. Mark Rose notes that Henry Fielding thought that "stupidly derivative writing cannot
be treated as property" or as original work. ROSE, supra note 178, at 116.
275. Alfred C. Yen, The IntradisciplinaryFuture of Copyright Theory, 10 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 423, 429 (1992)
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world. 276 Since the purpose of copyright is to balance the creative
incentive with maximum public access, 277 any test for infringement
should consider the importance of using prior works of poetry to
inspire and create new works. Different types of work depend more or
less on the forms that are in the public domain; it is therefore "very
difficult to lay down any legal definition of originality in a literary
composition that may be resorted to as a universal test."278 Courts
have interpreted the word "author" for purposes of copyright to mean
an "originator,''279 but the legal definition which has evolved through
case law does not appreciate the distinctiveness of authorship in
poetry. 280 Copyright law's misconceived focus on the "author" as
originator imposes court-made aesthetic determinations of originality
onto poetry 28 1 that fail to value poetry as a collaborative genre 282 in
which detail and form can be transformative.

VII. CONCLUSION
[Poets] words have made a world that transcends the world and a life livable in that
transcendence. It is a transcendence achieved by means of minor effects of figurations
and the major effects of the poet's sense of the world and of the motive of music of his
poems and it is the imaginative dynamism of all these analogies together. Thus poetry
becomes and is a transcendent analogue composed of the particulars of reality, created
by a poet's sense of the world, that is to
say, his attitude, as he intervenes and
283
interposes that appearances of that sense.

Mark Rose notes that copyright is still important to "our
conception of ourselves as individuals" and linked to protection of the
276. C.f id. at 423-25 (noting that creative production "depends on striking a socially
acceptable balance between the interests of authors and the public" so that authors can borrow
from the public domain without monopolizing it).
277. See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studious, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)
(Copyright involves balancing "the interests of authors and inventors in the control and
exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society's competing interest in
the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand.").
278. GEORGE TICKNER CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 170 (1847). "[In every
species of composition, in all literatures, there is of necessity a constant reproduction of what is
old, mixed with more or less that is new, peculiar and original." Id.
279. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884). "'[O]riginality' means
that the work derives from the copyright owner ....
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 22, at 14.
280. Cf. Peter Jaszi, The Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity, 10
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 293, 294-95 (1992) (noting the recent interaction between legal and
"cultural figuration[s]" of authorship).
281. See Price & Pollack, supra note 268, at 703 (questioning whether the "definition of
authorship, for purposes of copyright law, turns on anything more than the judge's perception of
the nature of the work produced").
282. Jaszi, supra note 280, at 304.
283. STEVENS, supra note 168, at 130.
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private sphere. 284 If copyright is to operate usefully for poetry or for
any other genre, it must use a standard for infringement that
accurately defines originality and extends protection accordingly. In
order to determine if one text inappropriately intrudes on another
text's expression, it is crucial to know how that type of text operates
and to know all of the elements that that type of text uses to express

itself .285
Poetry refuses to be neatly categorized as fiction, music, or a
visual art. 286 Poets make use of a complicated range of forms in order
to create meaning. 287 Poetry is unlike fiction because the elements
that make poetry distinct vary from the elements that make fiction
distinct. In fact, according to many poets, poetry is more about feeling
than understanding. 28 8 Wallace Stevens, for instance, thought that
poetry could not be written about directly because, unlike other
literary works, it seeks to test the limits of the rational by using many
sensory elements to express itself. 28 9 The sounds, the images, the
connotative and denotative elements of words, the image the poem
creates on the page, and the rhythm of the poem all work together to
create the "feeling" of the poem. 290 It is this combination of elements
that is original and that, therefore, should be protected by
copyright. 29 1 The Expressive Elements Test protects poetry by
assessing similarity of form and word choice on a sliding scale for
purposes of copyright.
Definitions of authorship for copyright purposes have yet to
reflect relevant literary theories. 292 Just as it is impossible to
generalize about a poet's process of imagination, 29 3 so is it impossible
to generalize about a poem's meaning or ideas. The meaning of a
294
poem unfolds "explicably and inexplicably in language" and form.
Any process of abstraction or filtration upsets the delicate web that a
284. ROSE, supra note 178, at 142.
285. Rotstein, supra note 14, at 725 (arguing that it "would be unthinkable for a court to
decide a patent or products liability case without at least trying to understand how the new
invention works or how the supposedly defective product malfunctioned").
286. "Indeed, the greater a work of art, the more stubbornly it resists simple explanation and
the more difficult it is to abstract from it that which makes it unique." Kurtz, supra note 17, at
1232.
287. Id.
288. See, e.g., Hall, supranote 175, at 22-23.
289. STEVENS, supra note 168, at 71-79
290. See infra Part IV.
291. Hall, supranote 175, at 25.
292. See Rotstein, supra note 14, at 726-30 (Positing that "current copyright dogma does not
recognize that so-called 'works of authorship' are.. unstable and dependent on context.").
293. See Orr, supranote 139, at 12.
294. Id.
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poet has woven and isolates words or ideas from the crucial context of
the poem. In The Red Wheelbarrow, Williams' original expression
consists of his "conscious analysis" of word combinations and lines to
create the unique impression of his particular view of a particular
glazed red wheelbarrow. 295
It is the literal form of The Red
Wheelbarrow and the word choice combined with that form that
Williams can claim ownership over and that should be exclusively his
for a limited time under the law of copyright. The Expressive
Elements Test, protects this literal form, and therefore, the original
expression in Williams' poem.
This test ensures that courts do not find The Red Wheelbarrow
substantially similar to just any other red wheelbarrow.

Jennifer Understahl*

295. Id. It is his revision of what already existed; "making new what may later be combined
again and made new again." Id.
*
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